The Kazan skyline.
13 November 2007
Orthodoxy and Islam share a companionable existence in Russia. But challenges loom for both faiths.
The Russian city of Kazan offers an unusual sight: a mosque and an Orthodox church stand inside the kremlin walls, symbolic of the importance of two religions in the history of Tatarstan.
Certainly, it is no coincidence that the site was selected to host part of this year's Valdai Discussion Club, an annual meeting of Russia foreign and domestic experts, as one of this year’s topics was religion and identity.
While the view of the Kazan kremlin offers a picture of serene coexistence, the relationship between Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church faces thorny dilemmas. Demographic changes and the role of religion in the Russian state place increasing pressure on Muslim-Christian relations.
Fifteen years after the fall of the atheist Soviet Union, religious issues have gained increasing prominence in both private and public life. Russia’s constitution guarantees the separation of church and state as well as an individual’s right to practice the religion of his or her choice. However, a 1997 law grants special status to the four main “traditional” religions – Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism.
President Putin and many other public figures in Russia are quick to point out their country's long history of Christian-Muslim coexistence, as compared to Western Europe’s difficulties with its own Muslim populations. Perhaps one of the main reasons for this coexistence is the close correlation between religion and ethnicity in Russia. Patriarch Aleksy II has stated explicitly that he does not consider evangelism among Muslims to be the responsibility of the church, and Muslim leaders take a reciprocal stance.
While the Orthodox Church includes believers of many nationalities, it looks on the Russian people as its primary mission. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of Russia's Muslims are members of non-Slavic ethnic groups. The mutual agreement not to encroach on the other's ethnic "territory" has allowed the church and Muslims to cooperate on areas of shared values.
INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE
Officials of both religions have banded together to present a united front on several issues. In 1998, the authorities established the Interreligious Council of Russia (IRCR), designed to be a formal and official format for dialogue among Russia’s religions. After interethnic violence broke out in the northern city of Kondopoga last year, Aleksy II and Islamic leaders called for measures to promote ethnic tolerance.
The Orthodox Church and Muslim organizations have also cooperated in the attempt to halt the advances of “nontraditional” religions into Russia. The deluge of foreign religious workers in the 1990s provided the impetus for the Orthodox Church and Russian Muslims to join forces and lobby the government for increased restrictions on newer religious groups. Both denounce attempts by foreigners to proselytize among ethnic Russians and indigenous minorities. For example, the IRCR came out against an attempt to open a Krishna temple in Moscow several years ago.
Metropolitan Kiril, who heads the Patriarchate’s external communications department, charged that residents would “misunderstand” the temple’s “dominant architectural and cultural position in the city.” One mufti on the council was more direct, calling the temple “blasphemous.” Only in April 2007 did Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov finally allocate land to worshippers. Roman Catholic and evangelical Christian groups also meet similar difficulties at the local level, often with “traditional” religious leaders agitating against their presence.
Another area of cooperation between Orthodoxy and Islam might be defined more generally as the defense of traditional values. Theological differences between Islam and Christianity are vast, but believers of both faiths share similar concerns over such issues as materialism, sexual promiscuity, and gay rights. Both religions also remain distrustful of Western liberalism, as evidenced by the 2005 "cartoon crisis" in Denmark, when the Russian Orthodox Church condemned the caricatures of the prophet Muhammad as an insult to Islamic – and overall religious – values.
Certainly, one should not underplay the scope of cooperation between the Orthodox Church and Islam nor the benefits of interreligious dialogue. However, the ability to cooperate has not eliminated the fundamental tension between the two religions as they seek to secure their place in Russian society.
The political arena represents one major battleground, since the Russian Orthodox Church sees itself as having a particular and special place in the history of the Russian people and state. The 2007 State Department International Religious Freedom Report indicates that the church has special arrangements to carry out religious education and counseling services with several federal agencies, and even in the absence of an official agreement the church often receives favorable treatment.
This cozy relationship with the state reflects the church’s deep-seated conviction that it represents a fundamental component of Russian society, and that while Islam may play an important role for some (non-ethnic) Russians, Orthodoxy alone is truly “Russian.” Aleksy II asserted in a 2006 interview with the BBC that the Church deserves a priority position in Russia because of its historical connection with Russian society and the formation of the Russian state. He denies any attempt on the part of the church to act as a "state church," but nonetheless has remained a firm advocate for the church’s special relationship with the Kremlin.
It is hardly surprising that Muslim leaders find such statements disconcerting and have often pushed back against the church’s efforts to realize this “special relationship.” Recent complaints made by Russia’s representatives of Islam focus on “clericalization,” the growing influence of the Orthodox Church in Russia’s government structures. Ravil Gainutdin, head of one of the top two Islamic government organizations in Russia, the Council of Russian Muftis, has vocally complained about cooperation between the church and the military. Orthodox clergy have maintained a consistent presence in the Russian army, especially during the Chechen wars, but imams have not been granted similar rights, nor has the government adequately provided for Muslim recruits’ religious needs.
An even more inflammatory issue is that of education. Religious authorities, government officials, and scholars have debated the introduction of mandatory high-school courses in some regions on Orthodoxy and its function in Russian history (such courses are electives in many localities, and other schools still have courses on general religious history). On the website for the Council of Russian Muftis, Gainutdin complained in January 2007 that such a course “is the imposition on all of society of the idea of the superiority of one culture and one people over the rest” and that it “places Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists in the position of little brothers.” Church leaders, however, assert that such courses are necessary for a true understanding of Russian history and culture and that after decades of forced atheism, it is only proper for Orthodoxy to return to the classroom.
NOT ENOUGH ORTHODOX BABIES
Given the tension at the highest levels of religious authority, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Islam seem to be headed toward increased conflict. This is in part because the two constituencies are changing in size. As ethnic-associated denominations, their membership relies more on the birthrates of their respective ethnic groups than on conversion.
The number of ethnic Russians, however, is shrinking at an alarming rate, due in large part to low birth rates and unhealthy lifestyles. Ethnic groups that practice Islam, on the other hand, tend to have both higher birth rates, although estimates on the growth of the “ethnic Muslim” population vary widely. Should current demographic dynamics continue, Russia’s Muslim groups will form an increasingly larger percentage of the population and will likely begin to demand proportional influence.
Islamic cadres will change, too, replacing the Soviet-era religious elite with a younger and potentially more assertive generation. In addition, the collaboration between the Kremlin and current Islamic authorities has created distrust between Islamic officials and much of the populace. Out of fear of “Wahhabis,” the center’s tight control over religion creates an environment where disaffected worshippers may turn to more radical versions of Islam, but certainly will look to more assertive Islamic organizations.
Given that the Orthodox Church’s actions proceed from its own sense of mission, it will likely continue to push for greater presence in schools, the military, and anywhere else deemed appropriate, believing that this role is not only a spiritual necessity but a historical entitlement. Thus far, state officials do not seem to be putting up much resistance to the church’s efforts to permeate non-religious institutions. And in turn, the church declares its support for state policies and government officials in turn promote policies favorable to the church. In spite of the increasing centralization, many decisions that affect the church are made at the local level and depend more on the attitudes of regional officials than those of the Kremlin.
The gap between religious belief and religious practice in Russia is quite large. According to a 2006 poll by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 84 percent of Russians believe in God, 63 percent consider themselves Orthodox, but only 7 percent actually attend services on a weekly or monthly basis. Therefore, while a majority of the Russian population identifies itself as Russian Orthodox, it is for cultural rather than purely religious reasons. This could reflect the continuing influence of atheistic communist ideology, while the younger generation that has grown up with the presence of the church may turn out to be more devout.
ISLAM’S DIVIDED LOYALTIES
Some things could retard Islam’s slowly increasing importance in Russian society and politics. The Muslim institutions still remain divided among rival factions, each jealously guarding its own authority and areas of influence. Should they consolidate, Russian Islam could speak with much greater authority and weight, speeding up its acquisition of special status.
Ethnic tension or breakouts of violence among Muslim groups may also provoke an oppressive backlash against Russian Islam; further radicalization among North Caucasian Muslims, or less likely in the Volga regions, could hurt the image of Islam among the largely ethnic Russian decision makers in the Kremlin.
Western liberal values may provide a common enemy for the Orthodox Church and Russian Islam in the short run, allowing close cooperation. In the long term, however, demographic forces and the inherent political nature of the religions will push them deeper and deeper into competition.
The birthrate of Russian Muslims and the immigration flows from Central Asia and the Caucasus will continue to add numbers and political clout to Islamic institutions. Ethnic Russians, however, will continue to decline in the absence of a major reversal in current trends.
At some point, Muslims may reach a critical mass and demand – and likely achieve – equal status with the Russian Orthodox Church, tempting the Kremlin to tap the Islamic faith more and more as a source of legitimacy. To forestall Islam’s rise, the Orthodox Church has an interest in keeping the Muslim institutions divided, and it may promote the idea that Islam is radical. At the very least, the church will continue to ignore and marginalize Islam’s role in Russian politics, history, and society.
.jpg)
No comments:
Post a Comment